March 15, 2006 | Volume 3, Issue 1
U.S. - China Foreign Policy Recommendations
Summary of recommendations
The United States should continue the policy of encouraging China’s political liberalization through active engagement in its economic development. Alternative policies taking a hard line on Chinese human rights violations, such as economic sanctions or regulations governing American business in China, will prove far less effective at achieving political reform. It is imperative, for both the U.S. economy and the Chinese people, that America’s internet companies maintain their ability to do business in China. They are playing a role in the development of a more prosperous and well-informed Chinese citizenry, which is a necessary precursor to political liberalization and protected human rights. As China’s economic development and global integration lay the foundations for democracy, U.S. policy should aid this process by (1) promoting the rule of law, (2) increasing bilateral exchanges of our citizens, and (3) passing the Global Internet Freedom Act.1
Economic development is leading to political reform but it takes time
A large body of academic research supports the link between economic development and democratically protected human rights. Seymour Martin Lipset’s seminal “Social Requisites for Democracy” (1959) first used statistical analyses to show a correlation.2 More recent scholarship has broadened the list of conditions supporting democracy from Lipset’s original focus on wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education. The need for a shift in the class power balance3 and the importance information access4 are now also considered key prerequisites to political liberalization.
The U.S. Department of State has incorporated this research and long supported a policy of economic engagement with China that promotes the social conditions necessary for political reform.5 But recently two prominent American companies, Google and Yahoo! Inc. were the focus of media attention regarding Google’s censorship of Chinese internet searches and Yahoo’s revelation of a Chinese journalist’s email information.6 Compromises by American businesses with the Chinese government are a necessary part of maintaining influence in China. Influence is necessary to raise living standards and provide access to information. Chinese political pressure on American companies and internet dissidents is not symptomatic of the failure of economic development to bring political reform, but rather evidence that the process is beginning to work.
China was granted World Trade Organization (WTO) membership in 2001, less than five years ago,7 and when China is evaluated using the democratic prerequisites outlined above, it becomes evident that the impact of development is still in its early stages. With respect to wealth, China’s per capita GDP has grown to an estimated $6200 in 2005, but it still ranks as lower-middle income among the world’s nations, behind authoritarian regimes in Belarus and Iran, and $3800 less than democratic Costa Rica.8 Considering industrialization, industry and construction now represent over 50 percent of GDP, but 49 percent of the actual labor force, almost 400 million people, continue to work in agriculture.9 Since 1978, China’s urban population has grown from 170 million to 453 million, but that still makes it only 31 percent urbanized, far less than the 78 percent found in wealthy democracies.10 In education, China’s 90.9 percent literacy rate also falls below Lipset’s benchmark of 96 percent for stable democracies.11 China had more than 100 million internet users accessing information in 2005, a figure second only to the U.S. but representing less than 8 percent of their population.12
These statistics describe a China that has begun to develop the social conditions that promote political liberalization, but this process has a long way to go. Evidence of this development’s impact on Chinese politics can be seen in increased citizen criticism of government actions during the SARS and avian flu outbreaks and, most recently, after a toxic spill on the Songhua River.13 More importantly, it can be seen in a recent report on China’s cyber police by the organization Reporters Without Borders. They report that “people in China are better informed today than at any previous period in history” and that, due to the rise of net dissidents, 30,000 people must now be employed by the government to monitor and censor the internet.14 Even with this effort, an estimated 30 percent of controversial messages still get through.15
The U.S. policy of economic engagement and the work of America’s internet companies are helping to build the foundations of democratic change in China. But the road is a long one and compromises by American businesses, to maintain their influence in China, are tolerable when viewed within this timeline.
Economic disengagement to pressure China on human rights will not work
Economic sanctions and similar punitive policies have a historically poor track record. According to an American Association for World Health study, “45 years of sanctions have ‘dramatically harmed the health and nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens’” without achieving political liberalization.16 Sanctions on Iran, Iraq, and Burma have produced similar results.
South African sanctions, a success story, show that effective sanctions must pressure democratic governments and must be applied multilaterally by major nations and organizations. China is not democratic; and U.S. disengagement will not be paralleled in other countries. In 2004, China received more than $60 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI).17 French President Jacques Chirac has said France and China should strengthen bilateral economic cooperation.18 Germany and China recently signed a treaty “fostering bilateral economic relations” and German companies have invested more than $10 billion in China.19 China is Japan’s second largest trading partner20 and Japanese FDI is more than $67 billion.21
Economic disengagement will not work with China. China is too strategically and economically important to the world. Any U.S. withdrawal would be filled by others and would only result in diminished influence in China and a damaged U.S. economy.
U.S. needs to complement its strategy of active economic engagement
The ability of American businesses to remain actively involved in Chinese development will insure that the social conditions necessary for political reform are being developed. But there is more that the U.S. can do to promote these conditions.
To help shift the balance of power away from the political elite, as Huber & Rueschemeyer suggest,22 the U.S. should work to develop Chinese institutions that enforce the rule of law. These institutions are growing in China. China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) membership has imposed laws on its dealings with companies23 and, as the private sector grows, there is an increased demand to define and protect property rights.24 Many social groups are “increasingly resorting to the law to protect their rights or protest perceived injustice.”25 The Chinese government is promoting these institutions “as a way of both staving off demands for further political liberalization and forcing societal demands into channels under its control,”26 but the U.S. has an opportunity to influence their development by offering assistance to “China’s fledgling legal system.”27
To improve Chinese understanding of democratic societies and to improve U.S. understanding of China’s unique situation, the U.S. should work to increase bilateral exchanges between the two nations. In 2004, the United States issued 25,647 student and exchange visitor visas to Chinese nationals,28 an infinitesimally small percentage of the population. The idea of democracy spreads faster when more people have a vivid experience of it. But increased exchanges should not be limited to students. Minxin Pei, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, also recommends “efforts to promote legislative exchanges between Congress and its Chinese counterpart, the National People’s Congress; creation of new programs targeting Chinese local legislators; high-level academic exchanges designed to influence elite-level thinking about political reform; technical assistance to village elections; and activities facilitating exchanges between civil society groups.”29 There is a lot of room for the U.S. to enhance the influence of its society on Chinese society.
Lastly, to provide the Chinese people with unfettered access to the internet and to mitigate the consequences of compromises, on the part of America’s internet companies with the Chinese government, the U.S. congress should pass the Global Internet Freedom Act. This bill, introduced by Rep. Chris Cox (R-CA) and Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) in 2003, “creates, and authorizes funding for, a new Office of Global Internet Freedom to counter Internet jamming and blocking by repressive regimes.”30 Employment of effective counter-censorship technologies minimizes the negative impact of doing business in China, and helps the Chinese people to become informed enough to pressure for political reform.
Conclusion
U.S. disengagement from China as a response to its lack of political reform is a bad idea. The conditions for such a strategy to be successful are missing. Continued engagement is a better option. Not only is it beneficial to the U.S. economy, it is having a major impact on Chinese development. Economic development, coupled a stronger rule of law, increased exchange programs, and counter-censorship technologies will create the social conditions necessary for China’s successful political liberalization.
1 HR48 Global Internet Freedom Act, http://zoelofgren.house.gov/iss_humanrights_viethr0048.pdf, accessed 3/5/06
2 Lipset, S.M. Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy.
The American Political Science Review. Vol. 53 (Mar., 1959) pp 69–105
3 Huber, E. & Rueschemeyer, D., & Stephens, J.D. The impact of economic development on democracy.
The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 7 (1993) pp 71–86
4 Kedzie, C. Communication and democracy: coincident revolutions and the emergent dictators.
RAND dissertation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD127/index.html, accessed 3/5/06
5 Statement by Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, 12/8/05,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/57822.htm, accessed 3/5/06
6 Olson, P. Gates’ Microsoft, Yahoo!, Google, Snub China Briefing. Forbes.com,
http://www.forbes.com/2006/02/01/microsoft-congressional-china-cx_po_0201autofacescan04.html,
accessed 3/5/06
7 World Trade Organization: Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, accessed 3/5/06
8 CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ, accessed 3/5/06
9 CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ, accessed 3/5/06
10 From China About China, http://www.chinagate.com.cn/english/2292.htm, accessed 3/5/06
11 Lipset, S.M. Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy. The American Political Science Review. Vol. 53 (Mar., 1959) pp 69–105
12 CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ, accessed 3/5/06
13 Marquand, R. Chinese decry toxic coverup, Christian Science Monitor,
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19 Deutsche Bank Research.
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21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Japan-China Relations.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/index.html, 3/6/06
22 Huber, E. & Rueschemeyer, D., & Stephens, J.D. The impact of economic development on democracy.
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24 Fewsmith, J. The political and social implications of China’s accession to the WTO. The China Quarterly.
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25 Gallagher, M.E. Reform and Openness. World Politics 54.3 (2002) pp 338–372, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v054/54.3gallagher.html, accessed 3/6/06
26 Gallagher, M.E. Reform and Openness. World Politics 54.3 (2002) pp 338–372, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v054/54.3gallagher.html, accessed 3/6/06
27 Minxin Pei. Future shock: WTO and political change in China. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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28 U.S. Department of State. U.S. Extends Visa Validity for Chinese Students and Exchange Visitors.
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30 Cox and Wyden Introduce Global Internet Freedom Act. Tech Law Journal. http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2002/20021010b.asp, accessed 3/6/06