March 15, 2006 | Volume 3, Issue 1

First Development, Then Environment

Environmental and Water Scarcity Issues in China

by Michael Siciliano

Introduction

The international spotlight has highlighted China’s rise in economic power for years. China’s rapid growth has affected everything from world energy supplies to grain prices and is now threatening the health of its citizens. The environmental degradation that continues to coexist with economic growth has caused unsustainable rates of deforestation, high levels of air pollution, and low levels of water quality and quantity. This paper addresses the current environmental situation and focuses on the struggle for clean water.

To fully understand the importance of the situation, it is necessary to look at the historical, social and political factors involved. This paper also attempts to show why environmental regulation and solutions to environmental issues have proved unsuccessful and what steps the international community is taking to improve the state of affairs.

Historical Background

China has a long history of exploiting the environment for industrial growth and economic gain. One of the predominate religions in China, Confucianism, describes man’s need to use nature for his own benefit. Under this religion, man had an obligation to control and sculpt nature; this is an ideology that was cast into action throughout the ruling dynasties. But not until Mao Zedong came to power, and later under Deng Xiaoping, did truly large-scale degradation occur.

Mao rose to power in 1949, and during his tenure created two major reforms: the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Under these reforms, unspeakable crimes against humanity occurred alongside environmental destruction. As Mao attempted to expand the population, he destroyed large swaths of forests, lakes and rivers to enable his grain-planting projects. These huge land reclamations were characterized by intensive farming, deep plowing and improper fertilization. The intense farming methods destroyed the fertile soils, eventually eroding the land down to the bedrock. Once soil is eroded that significantly, it can no longer be used for planting, and as a result, more land reclamations became necessary. Further, this massive deforestation later resulted in severe flooding.

Another example of the Confucian ideological underpinning in Mao’s reforms is clearly evident in dam building. When Mao came to power, there were 23 mid- to large-size dams. When he left office, there were more than 80,000, many of which collapsed after a few years, clogging rivers with silt and rendering the waterways useless¹. Qu Geping, the first director of China’s National Environmental Protection Agency, stated that “during the Great Leap Forward, factories were built haphazardly without any consideration for environmental protection. . .biological resources were seriously damaged, causing several losses to the ecosystem. . . There was extensive destruction of the natural environment of our country.”²

Things did not improve when Deng took over in 1978. China shifted to a market economy, and rapid expansion and economic growth ensued. China’s GDP grew by ten percent per year, and China became the second-largest economy in the world. The problem with these great economic strides was that the two decades of growth passed with little concern for the environment. Coal (which when burned releases harmful chemical compounds into the air) was the primary source of energy, massive deforestation transpired, and the burgeoning industries polluted the air and water. The political leaders of the 1980s and 1990s had a common saying, “First Development, Then Environment,” which highlights their knowledge of the harm this unregulated growth caused. The goals of government were single-mindedly focused on production and economic output. Officials looked the other way as factories dumped untreated waste in the rivers and released unfiltered smoke into the air.

Impact on the Environment

The environmental impact of this unbridled economic growth has been devastating. The massive deforestation which began under Mao continues today throughout China at unsustainable rates. In the mid 1990s, local officials received reports from the 140 forest bureaus across China. These reports indicated that 25 bureaus had completely exhausted their forest reserves, while another 61 were felling trees at unsustainable rates³. If these trends continue, China could have more than half of its forest bureaus working without any forest.

Deforestation plays a key role in several areas of environmental concern. First, when trees remain in place along hillsides and river banks, they prevent sediment runoff. The leaves of the trees reduce the impact of the rain on the soil and, by causing a softer rainfall, the amount of soil erosion is significantly reduced. By reducing the runoff of sediment and erosion, the shrinking of river channels further down stream is reduced. Furthermore, forests play a crucial role in the prevention of floods. As the roots of the trees wick moisture out of the earth, the soil is able to store more of the rainwater, reducing the amount which flows into the streams and rivers.

In 1998, a devastating flood occurred along the Yangtze River. The watershed area surrounding the Yangtze had been plagued by years of deforestation, losing over 85 percent of its forest cover⁴. This massive deforestation has caused flooding to occur twice as often and significantly more severely than in the past. The 1998 flood alone “resulted in 3,700 deaths, affected 223 million people, inundated 25 million hectares of cropland, and cost $30 billion.”⁵

Deforestation also leads to desertification. When forests were destroyed to create areas for farming, the soil was eroded down to the bedrock. This erosion turned farmland into unusable deserts. Today in China, one quarter of the land is desert, and in the north the rate of desertification has sharply increased to over 3,400 km2/year⁶. China currently has only seven percent arable land, much of which is being lost every year to desertification⁷.

The second most concerning environmental issue, after water scarcity, is air pollution⁸. The major contributing factor to this pollution is from coal use which provides the country with 75 percent of its energy needs. More than 70 percent of China’s urban population is exposed to air pollution. To compound this problem, 16 of the world’s 20 most polluted cities are in China⁹. Recent statistics have shown that in the 88 cities monitored, more than one-half exceed the World Health Organization’s (WHO) safety levels for ambient concentrations of sulfur dioxide, and 85 cities exceed the WHO guidelines for total suspended particle matter¹⁰. This air pollution causes 300,000 premature deaths a year¹¹. Research has shown the air in the most polluted cities contains such high levels of toxins that when a child breathes throughout the day, it is equivalent to smoking two packs of cigarettes¹². The air pollution resulting from factory and car emissions has perpetuated other concerns. Acid rain has become a widespread issue affecting over 40 percent of arable land, and according to the World Bank, contributes to crop loss of $5 billion a year¹³.

All of these issues do not simply affect China domestically; there are global implications as well. Sandstorms have been so severe that their effects have reached as far east as New England in the United States¹⁴. The international community, which has a great deal at stake in China’s economic viability, will be forced to address these concerns. The most pressing of these environmental concerns that could affect economic and political stability is water scarcity.

Water Scarcity Issues

The two major issues that confront China concerning water are quantity and quality. While China has an abundance of natural water resources, those resources become scarce when they must be distributed across a country as large as China and utilized by 1.3 billion people. On a per capita basis, the water resources in China are only one-fourth of the world’s average. Furthermore, the quality of water is poor. Of the 27 largest cities, only six provide their citizens with drinking water that meets state standards¹⁵. The dilemma involving the quantity and quality of water continues to grow as deforestation, drought, pollution, and inefficient delivery systems continue in China.

For many regions, especially in the north, water scarcity is at the core of their social, political and economic challenges. Wang Shucheng, the Chinese Minister of Water Resources, identified water scarcity as “an unavoidable issue threatening national security.”

China produces more organic water pollution than India, the U.S. and Japan combined. The primary contributing factors to this are untreated industrial waste and untreated domestic wastewater. The Chinese Institute of Water Resources reported that 80 percent of domestic wastewater is released without any form of treatment¹⁶. This discharge of wastewater amounts to nearly 43 billion tons yearly and pollutes 90 percent of urban waters and 70 percent of rivers¹⁷. The exact amounts of industrial wastewater are unknown due to sporadic use of treatment facilities and poor enforcement of regulation. Industrial waste, coupled with untreated domestic wastewater, results in water quality that is frighteningly poor. China’s State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) announced in its 2003 annual report that 70 percent of the water in five of the major rivers was not even suitable for human contact, let alone consumption¹⁸. When rivers reach this level of pollution, they cannot support aquatic life, and many rivers have been void of fish for years. Furthermore, this organic water pollution has penetrated beyond infecting the surface water found in lakes, rivers and streams. Over half the cities now have polluted ground water¹⁹.

Health Issues

A serious consequence of any pollution is the detrimental effects it has on the people who come in contact with it. Studies and anecdotal evidence in many of the provinces around China have produced startling statistics.

• A July 2000 study by the Chinese Preventive Medicine Journal determined that people in the Zhejiang region who had contaminated drinking water suffered from fatal intestinal cancer at rates five to eight times higher than surrounding regions²⁰.
• Impurities in the water in Shangdong province have resulted in people routinely suffering from brittle and cracking bones²¹.
• Beijing’s high levels of water pollution have caused recent rice harvests to contain high levels of mercury. Villages in watershed areas around Beijing face liver and esophageal cancer rates three times higher than areas with cleaner water²².
• Death rate along one stretch of the Huai River is one third higher than other provincial areas. A report out of this region stated that for years no male has been healthy enough to pass the physical exam to enter the army. In the dry season, the Huai River in these areas reaches a level V pollution rating, the worst rating possible, and is essentially nothing more than a large sewer²³.
• Numerous reports across China depict factories dumping untreated wastewater directly into rivers producing a toxic mix of ammonia and nitrogen compounds. This toxic mix destroys fisheries and infects people with dysentery.

The problems surrounding China’s quantity and quality of water continue to mount. As industrial developments mushroom, the pollution levels resulting from the increasing numbers of factories rise. These new factories require water to operate. Thus, not only are the factories polluting the water, they are also consuming it. The population in China continues to grow, along with urban incomes, causing the urban demand for water to increase as well. These factors create a vicious cycle of increasing demand and pollution on a dwindling supply of water. The World Bank has estimated that by 2010 the urban demand for water will increase by 60 percent, while the industrial demand for water will increase by 62 percent.

The question that one must ask is, “How will this demand be met?” According to current data and trends it is unlikely that China will be able to meet such demands. The Hebei Province, once home to 1,052 lakes, now has 83 lakes remaining²⁴. The largest lake on the Northern Plain, known as the ‘Pearl of the North,’ has dried up. The dry lake bed was once home to hundreds of thousands of fishermen who are now forced to weave mats for their livelihood²⁵. Just as the lakes have been subject to overuse and drought, so have the rivers. The Yellow River has been running dry in places since 1985. In 1999, the river ran dry for a period of 42 days, causing major disruptions to commerce and shipping²⁶.

The most striking of all effects from water scarcity and overuse are evident in the water tables, which are dropping by over a foot per year. This drop signifies that water is being used at unsustainable rates. Water tables, which usually run parallel to the ground, have slowly become conical as more water is drained than replaced. Part of this problem lies in the urban areas’ growing need for hydroelectric power. More water is constantly diverted away from the flood plains which naturally replenish the water tables. Even in southern areas where there is severe flooding, lack of infrastructure prevents the capture of flood waters which could be used to supply urban demand.

The concerns of water scarcity and pollution are not limited to environmental and health issues. Several serious economic and political concerns must also be addressed. The economic costs of water scarcity and pollution have been estimated at $14 billion in lost industrial output and another $5 billion in crop loss²⁷.

As with any scarce resource, especially one necessary for survival, the control and allocation creates conflict between competing groups. Two internal conflicts have developed in China over water scarcity. These conflicts are the north versus the south, and rural versus urban.

Social and Political Issues

The north versus south is really the tale of two cities. The north is home to 44 percent of China’s population and 58 percent of its cultivated land, but it contains only 14 percent of the water resources²⁸. Per capita, northern China has only one-tenth of the world’s average water supply. The arable land is decreasing here due to desertification, and water resources are dwindling due to drought and industrial and urban demand. The peasants in the north have seen crop failure rates as high as 33 percent in recent years because of drought, pollution, and scarcity of water needed for irrigation²⁹. Furthermore, China relies on the north for 50 percent of its wheat and 33 percent of its corn supplies³⁰. With such high amounts of cultivated land and agricultural output, it is essential that this region receives the needed water.

In the south, centuries of farming and deforestation have resulted in devastating floods along the Yangtze and Pearl Rivers. Ironically, two of the provinces, Guangdong and Hainan in the far southeast, are experiencing one of the worst droughts in decades. The problem is two-fold: how to deal with the drought and need for water in the north, and how to deal with the severe flooding in the south. To combat these opposing problems, China is undergoing a massive water diversion project. This project is one of the most expensive projects in history, costing more than $60 billion. The goal is to divert water from the flooding Yangtze in the south to the rapidly drying rivers of the north: the Huai, Hai, and Yellow. Two of the diversion arms are scheduled to be completed in 2007, and the final arm will be finished in 2025. Concerns have been raised over the efficacy of this project because it is a short-term fix to a large-scale and long-term problem. The huge costs may not seem justified if the drought in the two provinces in the far southeast continues. Much of the economic activity and Special Economic Zones are in the south, and so many people criticized the project for removing resources from the region.

A more volatile and politically charged issue exists between rural and urban water use. Currently, in the rural areas, agricultural use consumes two thirds of the nation’s water, yet produces only 15 percent of the GDP[31]. As water continues to become increasing polluted and increasingly scarce, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is forced to make tough allocation decisions. These decisions tend to favor urban use. As the urban centers continue to expand and drive the economy, local authorities have given water use priority to the industrial sector. As more and more water is diverted away from the rural users, the farms are becoming less productive and a general feeling of anger and hopelessness has followed. The grain harvest in 2001 fell to an all-time low and failed to meet consumption demands by 46 million tons, the largest deficit in history³².

The preferences given to urban areas have resulted in unrest and civil disobedience amongst the rural peasants. This unrest is exacerbated by the growing disparity between wages and social services between the rural and urban areas. Rural workers receive one-third of the annual income of their urban counterparts and have limited access to education and health services³³. The growing unrest has been played out in demonstrations and isolated acts of violence. Recently, in the southern province of Guangdong, six people were killed when officials blew up a water channel to prevent a neighboring community from diverting water to an industrial power station³⁴. The rising tensions are reaching new heights. Industry continues to pollute surface waters to levels that are unusable by farms for irrigation. The water pollution has created soil and crop contamination, and many of the yields have not been suitable for consumption.

The result of all this has been a large scale migration out of the rural areas and into the urban centers. To date, more than 130 million Chinese have migrated to the cities, fleeing their traditional farms and communities. This mass migration has caused problems with food shortages due to a lack of farmers and has created increases in unemployment and slums in the cities, which in turn have seen increases in disease, poverty and crime as migrants have swarmed in. The CCP has placed a political and social priority on curbing this migration, but migration is still expected to increase by between 30 and 40 million additional people by 2025³⁵.

Internal Solutions

As water scarcity drives food shortages, migration and rural unrest, the CCP has placed a priority on dealing with this issue. Three solutions have been proposed to control water scarcity, but all contain flaws. The first and most obvious solution is to simply begin a conservation program. Noting that agricultural use comprises two-thirds of all water usage, conservation has the potential to save a significant amount of water. However, lack of education among peasants, poor delivery systems, and extremely low water prices do not make this a viable option. A survey of 1200 farmers in China showed that fewer than 20 percent could tell the enumerators the price they paid for water³⁶. Consequently, water price is clearly not a factor in the minds of most farmers and thus there is little incentive to conserve.

The second solution builds upon the first by attempting to raise the price of water for the farmers. If there is no incentive to conserve water based on pricing, authorities can logically call for an increase in the price. Currently water pricing is three-tiered with the highest price for industrial use, lowest price for agricultural use, and domestic use falling in between. The problem with increasing prices is that it will subsequently lower the wages of farmers. Lower wages for farmers will increase wage disparity and may lead to an increase in migration. Both of these outcomes are in direct conflict with two other national policies created to ebb urban migration and increase rural wages.

The third and most viable solution is to create salable rights. Under this system, the price of water could remain low and keep rural wages stable. Farmers would still purchase their usual amount of water to run their farm. If they are able or willing to conserve water, they can then turn around and sell any surplus to consumers in the industrial sector at a higher price and earn a profit. This solution has the propensity to not only promote conservation but increase rural wages. A major stumbling block, however, comes in the form of China’s corrupt regulatory agencies and poor legal system. A transparent and independent legal system would be required to effectively enforce the contracts and negotiations necessary to handle a salable rights system. However, that legal system does not exist in China today.

China’s Legal and Regulatory Systems

China has “historically operated under the rule of men rather than the rule of law.”³⁷ Not until recently have environmental laws been codified. A rather large volume of environmental legislation exists on the books in China, but it says “nothing for the efficacy of these laws in protecting the environment.”³⁸ These environmental laws are subject to the same problems as general Chinese laws: they are vague in language and read more like policy pronouncements than enforceable laws³⁹. These laws also suffer from weak institutions, weak enforcement, and poor infrastructure, all of which do not come as a surprise considering the negative effect environmental protection has on economic growth⁴⁰. All of the aforementioned shortcomings are only compounded by the absence of an independent and transparent judicial system.

The environmental regulatory system in China works on two tiers: the higher central government and the lower local government. The environmental arm of the central government is largely comprised of SEPA and the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR). SEPA is in charge handling industrial wastewater and sewage. MWR is the agency responsible for creating the policies and laws and in 1988, enacted the first comprehensive water law⁴¹. MWR is comprised of several sub-agencies with overlapping duties, and this overlap often results in confusion and inefficiency. For example, if water is being pulled from the Yellow River at a single spot to be used for farming and for factories, three separate agencies with their own biases would be in charge of that water. One would deal with the agricultural use, the second would deal with the industrial use, and the third oversees the river itself. The diverse interests of the agencies, as well as the diverse uses of the water, severely hinders the creation of sound policy and results in internal conflicts⁴².

The authority to enforce the laws and policies created by the MWR is held by local government. This devolution of power is ripe for corruption. The Economic Research Service states that,

There are many sub-national water management institutions that also influence policy. On the local and provincial levelsthere are Water Resource Bureaus (WRBs) linked vertically to the MWR. But the heads of these WRBs are appointed by and report to the leaders within their own jurisdiction. The horizontal ties dominate the vertical ones. As a consequence WRBs execute water policy based on the needs of their own jurisdiction causing a considerable degree of diversity in water policies across regions⁴³.

The local officials responsible for appointing the heads of the WRBs usually have close ties with local business leaders and some in fact own the local factories⁴⁴. This political structure makes it extremely difficult to police and enforce laws against the local polluting factories because it is unlikely that a WRB official will bring sanctions against a factory owned by the person who appointed him. These factories are the cogs of economic growth: they spur the local economy and provide the leaders salaries. As a result, environmental policies set by the central government are unlikely to be enforced on the local level.

Industries and factories throughout China have the financial and engineering means to treat wastewater. Yet, due to the poor enforcement of laws and subsequent lack of consequences for pollution, most firms cannot justify the costs of such treatment. Some firms will only use their treatment facilities on the day on which an inspection by SEPA occurs, and inspections do not even occur yearly⁴⁵.

Even if a local industry or factory is cited for pollution by one of the local officials who has an economic stake in that company, the judicial body in China is still capable of corruption. Alex Wang notes that “Chinese courts are affected by a variety of outside influences, including the legislative and executive departments, the communist party, and commercial interests.”⁴⁶

The Chinese judicial structure breeds corruption mainly because the judiciary salaries, resources and funding are all provided by the local government⁴⁷. This structure severely limits the freedom of the courts and hinders the courts’ ability to make independent decisions. The traditional role and purpose of a judiciary body is not present. As stated previously, the ambiguity of environmental laws presents the opportunity for varied interpretations, which are usually determined on the local level where the laws are to be enforced. When the local government interprets laws, it tends to skew its interpretation to favor economic growth over environmental protection. When cases do come before judges, the judges tend to side with the local agencies’ interpretations of the law, primarily because these agencies pay the judges’ salaries⁴⁸. To compound the problems, judges tend to lack an adequate legal education⁴⁹. As a result, these judges not only operate in an environment that precludes independent interpretation of the law, but they also lack the capability to do so.

Within the regulatory agencies themselves there is a lack of trained legal staff. For example, in Shanghai, the local Environmental Protection Board hosts on its staff only three lawyers who are responsible for litigation as well as developing policies and bylaws⁵⁰. In contrast, the state of New York, with a comparable population, has 98 lawyers in its State Department of Environmental Conservation⁵¹. The lack of a trained legal staff further hinders the development, enforcement, and efficacy of environmental regulation.

However, progress has been made. China has been consistently building stronger legal infrastructure, drafting new laws and signing international agreements. Despite this, SEPA and the central government agencies are still weak and under-funded⁵².

Future Reforms

Sweeping reforms must take place in both the regulatory and judicial bodies in China if environmental protection statutes are to prove effective. The regulatory agencies must have greater power and broader control to internalize the conflicts stemming from the overlapping duties and competing interests of local agencies. No longer can three separate agencies, with three distinct agendas, regulate the water supply from a single source. The managers who run the local agencies must be separated from the local governments. Unless these two groups are separated and allowed to operate autonomously, the bias will always lean toward the economy at the expense of the environment.

In the judicial system, similar reforms must occur. The judicial system must be capable of operating as an independent and transparent structure. The judges need to be properly and formally trained with the power to independently interpret environmental statutes.

Help in transforming the current makeup of the regulatory and judicial bodies has come from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Historically, the development of NGOs was severely hindered by the communist party. Not until the mid 1990s did political space open, and even then, the government maintained tight controls over NGO activity. Restrictive regulations, established in 1998, required NGOs to meet three requirements: first, organizations were required to have approval from the government to apply for NGO status; second, NGOs were required to establish a legitimate source of funding and raise at least $12,000 for a national NGO and $3,750 for a local NGO; and third, no member of an NGO could have ever been deprived of political rights⁵³. The government does not want any non-official group to form and sway societal opinion which could eventually threaten its existence⁵⁴. As one Chinese scholar assessed, “the Party knows from its own existence that it is possible to start a mass movement capable of overthrowing a government from just a small group of about a dozen people… As such, control is vital.”⁵⁵

The communist party has tolerated NGO development because these NGOs play valuable roles by helping to keep local authorities accountable to the environmental policies set forth by the central government⁵⁶. NGOs also play crucial parts in delivering educational services that raise the general public’s awareness of environmental problems. The internet has been the greatest resource for NGOs, allowing local NGOs to form stronger movements, share ideas, and communicate progress.

Today in China, environmental NGOs perform a variety of functions. Many NGOs run urban renewal programs which promote recycling and efficient energy use. Others are involved in the direct training of lawyers and judges, while still others educate the public. Some of the oldest environmental NGOs deal with nature conservation and species protection. All of these functions produce positive results and, most of all, create awareness. This awareness, even in a communist country, is crucial to change.

Media coverage has also been vital to the public’s growing awareness of environmental issues. Coverage of such issues has tripled in recent years. A poll conducted in 2000 showed that environmental degradation was the number one concern of urban Chinese; similar polls showed environmental issues consistently ranked among the public’s top five major concerns⁵⁷. There is no question that awareness and concern are present. The question that does remain is what to do about it.

Two other outside factors that could influence future reforms in China are the nation’s ascension to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the Olympics, which are to be held in Beijing in 2008. The WTO ascension could produce positive environmental results by forcing China to produce new environmental laws that affect free trade, as well as by placing pressure on the judicial system for greater transparency⁵⁸. The Olympics, by means of national pride, could compel China to strictly enforce its laws in hopes of creating a greener, more beautiful country. This is an opportunity for China to ‘showcase’ its land to the rest of the world.

According to Elizabeth Economy, in her book The River Runs Black, environmental reform has been dramatically successful and produced positive results when three features are present⁵⁹:

1. Top local officials support the environment;
2. Strong levels of environmental support exist from the international community; and
3. Domestic resources are available to local leaders to address environmental challenges.

Because of the systemic corruption based on the devolution of power to local governments, it is essential that the local officials place environmental protection as a top priority. It is these officials who must set the standard for the region and enforce sanctions against polluting industries. International support and domestic resources increase the officials’ abilities to protect and enforce.

While there are diverse methods of reform at work, it seems that the main hindrance to any effort might come from the Communist Party itself. It is clear from the large amounts of legislation produced by the central government that the Communist Party aspires to preserve the environment. But these laws and statutes have been enforced only on a limited basis due to corrupt local officials and courts. As the country continues to look the other way while pollution destroys the air and water quality, the citizens are forced to live under the darkening conditions. The aspirations for improvement are there, but the willingness to sacrifice economic growth for conservation and preservation has yet to be seen. Tensions continue to rise amongst the citizens as levels of cancer and disease increase, farms productivity decreases, water scarcity mounts, and migration levels soar. In short, the whole system seems to be reaching its breaking point.

Push Toward Democracy

As discussed previously, there have been acts of civil disobedience, isolated instances of violence and a growing unrest predominately among the rural peasants. Small-scale local citizen protests have proved successful in a shutting down a few of the worst factories. Whether or not a larger scale protest could occur, or would even be allowed to occur by the Communist Party, remains unclear. It is evident that the private citizens have no means to force industries to comply with environmental statutes and no voice with which to raise their concerns. Therefore, the unrest continues to grow. If another Tiananmen Square-like incident occurred in 2006 the results could be drastically different. China has too much riding on international support and international markets for the military to simply bring in the tanks under the watchful eye of the international media; the backlash that would occur from government-sanctioned military violence would be too great. The voices of the citizens would have to be heard, not only by the Chinese Communist Party, but by the international community as well.

A group of environmentalists exists in China today whose interests and activities far surpass the activities allowed by the central government. This group is led by a few renowned figures who have clearly articulated the philosophical link between effective protection of the environment and the need for democracy⁵⁰. Economy notes that “many have come to environmental protection as an outlet for their democratic leanings; others come to democracy from their belief in what it can do for environmental protection.”⁶¹ For a number of reasons, these figures cannot create their own NGO, and many live outside of China, but their words, writings, and ideas have reached the leaders and future leaders of NGOs. “Even those leaders of environmental NGOs that publicly eschew discussion of such issues privately acknowledge the necessity of greater openness for environmental protection.”⁶²

A few years back, an organization emerged in China called the China Democratic Party (CDP). This party highlights the CCP‘s fear of NGOs. The CDP rallied membership over the internet and had members scattered throughout the country⁶³. The mission of the CDP was to form an alternative political party, an activity quickly suppressed by the government. Beijing cracked down, banned the organization, and sought out and arrested the leaders⁶⁴. While this organization was quickly shut down and never reached NGO status, it demonstrated that the desire for change amongst the citizens is not only environmental but political, and is seen as so necessary that they are willing to risk their lives.

All of these issues will be played out over the coming years. There is no avoiding the water scarcity issue in China. As of May 2005, 400 of China’s 660 cities suffer from serious water shortages⁶⁵, and all are dealing with the effects of pollution. This could prove, as the Minister of Water Resources said, to be the “unavoidable crisis affecting national security.” Already billions of dollars are being spent to control the issue. But once again, these are short-term solutions for a long-range problem. Reform needs to take place among the regulatory agencies, the judicial system and the political system. The international community needs to play a greater role in protecting China’s environment, as it too has much at stake. Better infrastructure capable of efficiently delivering irrigation water and capturing flood water needs to be built. Modern methods of domestic wastewater treatment must be developed. As “environmental degradation and other political considerations fuel awareness and political activism, environmental NGOs [will continue to become] the lightening rods through which popular social and political discontent are channeled.”⁶⁶ But, mostly, it will be the education and frustration of the citizens forced to live with the industrial pollution that illicit the greatest change. After all, it is these citizens who comprise the country’s greatest economic asset and are the key to continued growth.

Conclusion

The environmental problems in China are numerous, and include desertification, deforestation, air pollution and water pollution. These issues have converged to become the catalyst for large-scale rural-to-urban migrations and rural unrest. The central government has been working to produce the legislation needed to protect and preserve the country’s environment. However, the systemic failings and inability to enforce the legislation falls on the heterogeneous local governments and the weak judicial system. If China hopes to continue its rise and become an economic superpower, the environment and the health of its citizens must be protected.

¹ Kattoulas, Velisarious. “Witness to a Crisis” Far Eastern Economic Review. September 27, 2001.

² www.2.kenyon.edu/depts./religion/fac/adler/reln270/feer-environment.htm retrieved on 5/31/2005

³ Economy, Elizabeth. “The River Runs Black.” Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 2004. 51.

⁴ Ibid 64.

⁵ Abramovitz, Janet. “Record Year for Weather Related Disasters” November 27th, 1998. fn6. http://www.worldwatch.org/press/news/1998/11/27/ Retrieved on July 12,2005.

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Luard, Tim. “Paying the Price for China’s Growth.” BBC News, China. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3743332.stm Retrieved on 5/31/2005.

¹⁰ Zhidong, Li. “Energy and Environmental Problems Behind China’s High Economic Growth.” March 2003. Nagoaka University of Technology.

¹¹ Luard, Tim. “Paying the Price for China’s Growth.” BBC News, China. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3743332.stm> Retrieved on 5/31/2005.

¹² Wang, Alex. “The Downside of Growth: Law, Policy and China’s Environmental Crises” Perspectives vol. 2, no. 2. www.oycf.org/perspectives/8_103100/downside_of_growth.htm Retrieved on 5/31/2005

¹³ Economy, Elizabeth. “The River Runs Black.” Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 2004. 85.

¹⁴ Ibid 85.

¹⁵ Ibid 88.

¹⁶ Ibid 66.

¹⁷ Ibid 69.

¹⁸ Ibid 69.

¹⁹ Zhidong, Li. “Energy and Environmental Problems Behind China’s High Economic Growth.” March 2003. Nagoaka University of Technology.

²⁰ Nathan, Nankivell. “China’s Mounting Water Crisis and the Implications for the CCP” Presentation given from December 3–5 2004.

²¹ Zhidong, Li. “Energy and Environmental Problems Behind China’s High Economic Growth.” March 2003. Nagoaka University of Technology.

²² Economy, Elizabeth. “The River Runs Black.” Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 2004, 84.

²³ Kynge, James. “Yellow River Brings Further Sorrow to Chinese People.” Financial Times 1/7/2000

²⁴ Economy, Elizabeth. “The River Runs Black.” Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 2004. 84.

²⁵ Ibid 4.

²⁶ Laura, Kaminski. “Public Sector Water Conservation” http://www.glc.org/wateruse/conservation/pdf/Part1.pdf Retrieved on April 3, 2006. 1.

²⁷ Economy, Elizabeth. “The River Runs Black.” Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 2004. 69.

²⁸ Ibid 69.

²⁹ World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/china/clrwt-sum.htm Retrieved on 5/31/2005

³⁰ Nathan, Nankivell. “China’s Mounting Water Crisis and the Implications for the CCP” Presentation given from December 3–5 2004.

³¹ Ibid

³² Ibid

³³ Ibid

³⁴ Brown, Lester. “Worsening Water Shortages Threaten China’s Food Security.” Earth Policy Institute. October 4, 2001. http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/Update1.htm retrieved on 5/31/2005

³⁵ Nathan, Nankivell. “China’s Mounting Water Crisis and the Implications for the CCP” Presentation given from December 3–5 2004.

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Economy, Elizabeth. “The River Runs Black.” Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 2004. 18.

³⁸ Lohmar, Bryan. “China’s Agricultural Water Policy Reforms.” Economic Research Service. http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib782/ retrieved on 5/31/2005.

³⁹ Economy, Elizabeth. “The River Runs Black.” Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 2004. 112.

⁴⁰ Wang, Alex. “The Downside of Growth: Law, Policy and China’s Environmental Crises” Perspectives vol. 2, no. 2. www.oycf.org/perspectives/8_103100/downside_of_growth.htm Retrieved on 5/31/2005

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² Lohmar, Bryan. “China’s Agricultural Water Policy Reforms.” Economic Research Service. http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib782/ retrieved on 5/31/2005.

⁴³ Economy, Elizabeth. “The River Runs Black.” Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 2004. 112.

⁴⁴ Wang, Alex. “The Downside of Growth: Law, Policy and China’s Environmental Crises” Perspectives vol. 2, no. 2. www.oycf.org/perspectives/8_103100/downside_of_growth.htm Retrieved on 5/31/2005

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Wang, Alex. “The Downside of Growth: Law, Policy and China’s Environmental Crises” Perspectives vol. 2, no. 2. http://www.oycf.org/perspectives/8_103100/downside_of_growth.htm Retrieved on 5/31/2005

⁴⁸ Ibid

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ Economy, Elizabeth. “The River Runs Black.” Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 2004. 113.

⁵² Ibid 113.

⁵³ Ibid 113 .

⁵⁴ Ibid 133.

⁵⁵ Ibid 133.

⁵⁶ Ibid 133.

⁵⁷ Ibid 21.

⁵⁸ Ibid 131.

⁵⁹ Ibid 177.

⁶⁰ Ibid 24.

⁶¹ Ibid 137.

⁶² Ibid 137.

⁶³ Ibid 137.

⁶⁴ Ibid 133.

⁶⁵ Ibid 134.

⁶⁶ Economy, Elizabeth. “The River Runs Black.” Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 2004. 136.

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