Carnegie Mellon Heinz College

Introduction

As global leaders work to develop policy responses to the recent international financial crisis, the Group of 20 (G-20) emerges as the forum of choice for coordinating among the leaders of “systemically important” global economies, usurping this role from the G-8.  In a rapidly changing global economy no longer dominated by traditional Western powers, the G-8 lacks the legitimacy necessary to respond to the crisis.  As a result, the G-20, a forum more inclusive of the major emerging market power and more geographically representative comes to the fore.  The G-20 and G-8 are examples of a “networked” system of global governance, “one in which economic decisions are increasingly made in informal networks, rather than in formal international organizations.”[1]  Some observers have touted the shift from the G-8 to G-20 as a dramatic reconfiguring of world order.  These claims are overstated.  Rather, the deliberations of the G-20 leaders have resulted in subtle shifts in the balance of international power and have begun the process of catalyzing reform in international financial institutions. Despite these shifts, the United States still plays the largest role in setting the agenda to respond to the crisis.

To facilitate my analysis of the power shifts underlying the G-20 response to the economic crisis, I have divided this paper into three parts. First, I will first touch on the background and history of the G-20.  Then, I will go through a brief history of the financial crisis that led George Bush to call the first G-20 leaders meeting in Washington DC on November 14-15, 2008.  Finally, I will consider the actions taken at the November summit and follow up London summit on April 2, 2009 in light of emerging nation influence.

Background: The Roots of the G-20

The G-20 emerged out of what scholar Peter Hajnal describes as the G-7/G-8 system of global governance.  The G-7/G-8 system describes a network of global summits, ministerial forums, meetings and working groups centered around annual meetings of the leaders of the G-8 countries.[2]  The G-7/G-8 grew out of meetings between the finance ministers of Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, the United States and France sparked by the economic turbulence of the early 1970s.  These early meetings eventually led to a meeting of the leaders of the five countries as well as Italy in Rambouillet in 1975.  Shortly thereafter, Canada was invited to join, creating the G-7; in 1998, Russia joined, creating the G-8.  The G-7/G-8 system is unique from other systems of global governance in that it remains, even after 30 years, an informal organization without any sort of charter, permanent Secretariat, or permanent staff.  Instead, each country takes a take a turn as chairing the group and hosting the leaders’ summit.  Though the G-7/G-8 system has grown more institutionalized over the years, it remains a forum for discussion and policy coordination, rather than an institution that creates and implements policy.[3]

In September 1999, G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors initiated the creation of the Group 20 finance ministers and central bank governors in response to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998.  This crisis revealed the growing interdependence of the globalized economy, and the inadequacies of the current system of global governance.  The G-7 governments realized that reforms in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis would have to include a forum that more actively engaged developing countries in the system of global economic governance.  The structure for this engagement still needed to be determined.  One option considered was the Interim Committee of the IMF.[4]  The US Treasury felt this avenue would be too broad, would not be conducive to informal discussion, and would leave Asian economies underrepresented.  Creating a new group within the structure of the G7/G8 system offered a more informal setting for discussion.  The G-20 was preceded by two ad hoc groups of developing nations: the G-22, or the “Willard Group,” and the G-33.  However, both of these groups were ill-fitted to offer a permanent solution – the G-22 was not geographically representative enough and the G-33 was simply too large.[5]

Thus, throughout the summer of 1999, the G-7 crafted a mandate and negotiated membership for a new forum that would promote “dialogue among systemically important countries within the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system.”[6]  Canada, led by finance minister Paul Martin played a key leadership role in bringing the new forum to fruition.  Membership was ultimately negotiated between the US Treasury Secretary and the Canadian Finance Minister.  Membership was extended to the finance ministers and central bank governors of the G-7 countries as well as Russia, China, Brazil, India, Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, Australia, Korea, Argentina, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union.  Moreover, positioning the group within the Bretton Woods framework, the Managing Director of the IMF, the President of the World Bank, and the Chairpersons of the IMFC and the World Bank Development Committee were added as ex officio members.  Membership was chosen to maximize geographic representation and legitimacy, while still keeping the size manageable.[7]  In total, members represent over 60% of the world population and nearly 80% of the world’s economic output.[8]

The newly formed Group of 20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors held their first meeting in Berlin on December 15-16, 1999.  As they noted in their inaugural communiqué, the purpose of the group was “to provide a new mechanism for informal dialogue in the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system, to broaden the discussion on key economic and financial policy issues among systemically significant economies and promote cooperation to achieve stable sustainable world economic growth that benefits all.”[9]  The structure of the G-20 was modeled after the G-7/G-8 with a focus on informal dialogue, no staff or permanent Secretariat, and an emphasis on consensus decision-making.  Just as in the G-8, the chair of the group rotates on a yearly basis, acting as a host country for the annual ministerial summit.  The summits are planned by a management “Troika,” consisting of the past chair, current chair, and upcoming chair countries.  The primary product of each G-20 summit was a communiqué that outlined, in varying levels of detail, agreements and commitments that the group had reached over the course of the summit.[10]

The G-20’s early focus, stemming from its mandate, was “crisis prevention and resolution, with the emphasis on prevention.”[11] Over time, the group’s concerns diversified, becoming a forum for discussing a variety of challenges within an increasingly globalized economy.  For example, following the lead of the G-8, the group developed a strong focus on combating the financing of terrorism after September 11.[12]  More recently, beginning with the 2005 summit in China, the reform of Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF and World Bank) became a key focus at the forum.  In 2006, G-20 influence led to the increase of IMF quotas for China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey.[13]  The G-20 has been a distinctly pro-globalization group, though with perhaps more nuanced policy views than the Washington Consensus of the 1990s.[14] 

The effectiveness of the G-20 as a forum for influencing international economic policy is difficult to quantify.  While the examples cited in the previous paragraph provide some anecdotal evidence of the impact of the forum, concrete measures of effective action taken by the G-20 remain elusive.  A history of the G-20, prepared for the South Africa summit in 2007, notes that one of the main achievements of the group has been building personal relationships between the ministers with a focus on “policy co-operation rather than policy coordination.”[15]  Looking back over the first nine summits, the document notes that while the G-20 may have a shared set of principles around the global economy, they have been “less successful in putting these broad policy objectives into operation” and have been unable to resolve “major international macroeconomic issues,” such as “global imbalances and further trade liberalization.” [16]  More successful have been microeconomic reforms, such as the adoption of international codes and standards by the member countries and the work to disrupt terrorist finance networks.[17]  However, as the events of the recent financial crisis have illustrated, the G-20 has been less successful at achieving its original mandate: promoting “stable” world economic growth and crisis prevention.

Despite these short-comings, the G-20 has provided a more broadly representative, and therefore more legitimate, forum for decision-making about global economic governance.  Indeed, one scholar wrote before the financial crisis that the G-20 “appears to be evolving into the most influential forum for exploration of longer-term issues and institutional reform,” because of its greater legitimacy and representativeness.[18]  Though the G-20 certainly offered a more representative forum than the G-8, critics have questioned whether it is representative enough.  Shortly, after its establishment, one critic noted that “the G-20 is severely flawed in that it contains no representation . . . from the poorest or smallest developing countries” or from European allies who might be expected to speak on their behalf.[19]  Similarly, Leonardo Martinez-Diaz has argued that after 8 years of the G-20, the group has generally reflected G7 policy priorities, giving these G7 policies a broader base of legitimacy and support, rather than reflecting the concerns of developing nations.  He notes, however, that developing countries have become more assertive as the forum has evolved, particularly with regards to sovereign debt restructuring and the reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions.[20]  This assertiveness would only continue to grow as the global crisis moved the G-20 onto center stage.

Despite these caveats, the G-20’s strength as a forum ultimately lies in its broader representativeness.  As observed by the G-20 in 2007, the group’s “comparative advantage over the G-7 lies in the global economic and financial issues that require broad international cooperation, including that of emerging market economies.”[21]  It is this competitive advantage that thrust the G-20 into the spotlight as world leaders tried to craft a response to the crisis that ripped through the global financial system in Fall of 2008.

Towards Washington: The Growth of the Financial Crisis

The current international financial crisis began in the United States when the housing bubble burst.  The collapse of the housing market, combined with the deterioration of underwriting standards for mortgages, led to a spike in foreclosures, which spread to the financial system through mortgage- backed securities.  The rapid devaluation of mortgage-backed securities exposed the fact that banks and other firms were significantly overleveraged.   This capital shortage led to an initial tightening of the credit markets as banks became more risk-adverse.  When the US Treasury let Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008, it sent a shockwave through the international financial system.  The stock market tumbled and credit-markets contracted even further as banks, fearing insufficient liquidity, stopped lending.[22]  Thus, the financial crisis spread to the real economy, as businesses were unable to get loans to make payroll and people saw a dramatic decline in the value of their investments.

The advanced economies were hit first by crisis, which then spread to the emerging economies and developing world.  In a note to the G-20 deputies, the IMF underscored that “disorderly deleveraging” in developed nations “led to a sharp reversal of capital flows from emerging economies in October and November of 2008.”[23]  At the same time, commodity prices collapsed, furthering the negative impact on emerging and developing nations.[24]  In November 2008, the IMF lowered its forecast for global growth in 2009 by 0.8% to 2.2% and its forecast for emerging economy growth by one percent to 5.1%.[25]  The situation for industrialized countries was even worse, as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Germany all faced negative growth projections for 2009.[26]

With this rapidly deteriorating situation as a backdrop, the US Treasury hastily planned the first G-20 leaders’ summit in Washington, DC for November 14-15, 2008.  It would be held shortly after the annual meeting of the finance ministers and bank governors in São Paulo, Brazil on November 8-9.  At first, the United States was reluctant to call for the summit, fearing that an emergency meeting of the leaders might further destabilize a fragile financial system.  A meeting with French President Nicolas Sarkozy on October 18 finally convinced President Bush it was time to act.  Where past financial crises would have been sorted out by the G-7 or G-8, there was broad recognition that the G-8 lacked the necessary representation to craft a legitimate response to the crisis without other important emerging economies, especially China.  Bush and others saw the G-20 as convenient forum – a pre-existing group that included all the key players.[27] Thus, it was that the G-20, born out of the Asian financial crisis one decade earlier, became the forum through which international leaders would strategize to address this new global crisis.  As one observer put it, “The old order has effectively acknowledged that the rest of the world is too important to keep from the room.”[28]

The Washington Summit: November 14-15, 2008

Though emerging economies were at the table in Washington, the Western powers were still setting the agenda.  The United States, as the host of the leaders meeting, and the French, who held EU’s presidency at the time, each had an agenda to push.  As John Kirton, a long time G-8/G-20 observer, put it, the US approach was “go slow, go long, go limited, go light,” whereas France’s was “go fast, go short, go wide, go deep.”  This meant the United States saw the Washington summit as one of many, sought to focus solely on the financial crisis, and wanted to focus on reforms of the current system, rather than a complete overhaul.  France sought a more comprehensive summit agenda, one that moved quickly to find solutions and moved boldly to create new international institutions.  Kirton anticipated that the US agenda would prevail; both because of divisions among the Europeans, the feelings of Japan and Canada, and also China did not seem inclined to favor the French approach.[29]  The practical consideration of the upcoming change in administration in the United States also assured that the summit would “go slow.”  With the election of Barack Obama 10 days before the summit, George Bush no longer had the legitimacy to craft any broad ranging commitments.

Thus, despite acclaim from some that the G-20 represented a significant global power shift, the agenda was still largely being set in maneuvers by the countries of the G-8.  However, the developing nations of the G-20 did not allow one of their central issues to be pushed to the side.  The agenda included a discussion of the reform of international financial institutions, bringing an issue that had been on the G-20’s agenda since 2005 to new heights.  China, in particular, went into the summit seeing these reform efforts as a key piece of the work of the leaders’ summit.[30]

The results of the first G-20 leaders summit generally met the modest expectations most outside observers had going in.  As one put it, the summit was “neither a large disappointment nor a triumph.”[31] The communiqué included a statement on the causes of the financial crisis, indicating comments, such as “weak underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices . . . excessive leverage” as well as the sufficiently vague “inconsistent and insufficiently coordinated macroeconomic policies.”[32]  The summit produced an action plan to address the crisis, though it was short on measurable objectives.  It sought to further five common principles of reform: 1) “Strengthening Transparency and Accountability,” 2) “Enhancing Sound Regulation,” 3) “Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets,” 4) “Reinforcing International Cooperation,” 5) “Reforming International Financial Institutions.”[33]  The communiqué also contained a commitment to free trade, in which the countries pledge to refrain from adopting new protectionist measures for the next 12 months.  The communiqué ended with an affirmation of the importance of the Millennium Development Goals, but no new commitments for developing countries.[34]

After the release of the communiqué, some leaders within the G-20 seized the summit to claim a shift in global power.  Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva said after the summit, “We are talking about the G20 because the G8 doesn’t have any more reason to exist.”[35]  Lula and the other non-G-7 nations did have concrete commitments from the summit to base their new found sense of power on.  In one of the few concrete action steps, the summit action plan indicated that the Fiscal Stability Forum (FSF), a standard-setting authority made up largely of representatives from the G-7 national financial intuitions, should take steps to expand its membership by March 31, 2009.  The action plan also indicated “that the Bretton Woods Institution’s must be comprehensively reformed so that they can more ably reflect the changing economic weights in the world economy.”[36] An American official indicated that this commitment would lead to “a painful fight.  The Europeans are significantly overrepresented.”[37]  Despite this potential opposition, the non-G7 G-20 members utilized the crisis to further the push for the reforms of international financial institutions that they had been pursuing since 2005.

Language that was left out of the communiqué offers other evidence of the influence of the emerging market countries, in particular China, at the November summit.  After the completion of the November leaders’ summit, Il SaKong, advisor to South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, noted that global imbalances, “one of the main causes of the global financial turmoil,” were not reflected in the leaders’ summit conversation or communiqué.[38]  This is somewhat surprising, given that the communiqué released by the G-20 financial ministers one week before the Washington summit specifically mentions “inconsistent macroeconomic policies, which gave rise to domestic and external imbalances” as a precipitating force of the crisis.[39]  However, in the leaders’ communiqué the following week, this language becomes the imprecise “inconsistent and insufficiently coordinated macroeconomic policies.”[40]  The decision to shift language was probably a reflection of China’s unwillingness to discuss global imbalances.  David McCormick, Undersecretary of the Treasury at the time, indicated later that China’s presence in the G-20 was the reason that global imbalances were not discussed.[41]  This shift in language shows China’s influence at the G-20 leaders’ summit to protect its national interests.

In the time between the November leaders’ summit in Washington and the April leaders’ summit in London, the progress made towards addressing the financial crisis within the framework crafted in Washington was inconsistent.  For example, the pledge to avoid protectionism lasted all of two days after leaders left Washington.  Two days after the summit, Russia indicated it would raise tariffs on imported car.  The following day, India placed a 5% duty on several steel and iron products.[42]  However, nations did take proactive steps to address the crisis.  The US, under the new Obama administration, enacted a large fiscal stimulus plan in February.  However, the administration made little progress on bank reform during that time.  Several facets of the Washington Action Plan moved forward, including plans for better regulatory coordination and recommendations on procyclicity in regulation.[43]  

One notable advance was the expansion of membership of several different international financial intuitions, led by the Fiscal Stability Forum.  On March 12, the FSF announced it would broaden its membership to include “the G20 countries that are not currently in the FSF” as well as Spain and the European Commission.[44]  This expansion represented a real first step for the emerging countries of the G-20 to have a greater voice in international financial governance.  In addition to the FSF, other international financial institutions embarked on membership reform before the London summit.  Members of the International Accounting Standard Board approved an expansion of membership to 16 and provided guidelines for geographic diversity.  Brazil, China, and India accepted the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) invitation to join its Technical committee.  Additionally, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision expanded its membership to include Australia, Brazil, China, Korea, India, Mexico, and Russia.  Thus, the inter-summit period saw the non-G7 G-20 members take tangible steps towards gaining a more prominent voice in international financial governance.

The London Summit: April 2, 2009

With more secure US leadership in place, expectations for the London Summit were higher than they had been for Washington, but still moderate.  On the Financial Times noted, “Even if the summit is a success, it will not be an end point but a staging post on the road to recovery.”[45]  However, the run up to the summit was not without intrigue.  There was again a clash between the priorities of Continental Europe and the United States.  The French and the Germans wanted a focus on stronger regulation, whereas the US sought a focus on fiscal stimulus and steps to restore growth.  A side skirmish was occurring between the French and the Chinese over the issue of tax havens.  On top of these conflicts, the IMF managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn said she felt both the US and Europe were “not yet moving quickly enough in doing the cleaning up for the financial system.”  The head of the FSF echoed Strauss-Kahn’s warnings about the banks.[46]

The resulting communiqué offered enough for French President Sarkozy to claim victory on regulations, and also offered new promises to support developing nations through the IMF and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).  The communiqué included a commitment to regulate for the first time “systemically important hedge funds,” as well as endorse the FSF’s “tough new principles” on executive compensation.[47]  The communiqué also included large commitments of funds to support developing countries, including a commitment to offer the IMF up $500 billion dollars in new resources, support a new allocation of $250 billion of the IMF’s special drawing rights, and support $100 billion in additional lending by the MDBs.[48]  The communiqué again committed to reform the IMF and World Banks, now with specific timelines; the IMF would complete its next review of quotas by January 2011 and the World Bank reforms would be agreed upon by the Spring 2010 meetings.  The communiqué also included additional language on preventing protectionism and offered $250 billion over the next two years to support trade finance.[49]  

The results of this summit included several clear wins for emerging economies and developing nations.  First, for the emerging nations of the G-20, the summit led to the decision to expand the mandate of the FSF and rename it the Financial Stability Board (FSB).  The new FSB would have a host of responsibilities aimed at assessing vulnerabilities in the financial system and promoting communication and good regulation.  Under the new mandate, the FSB and the IMF would work hand in hand to assure financial system stability.[50]  This change offered a powerful new mandate to an organization in which the non-G-7 G-20 countries had just gained representation.  Additionally, after working for 4 years through the G-20 to push for reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions, the emerging nations of the G-20 were finally able to secure concrete timeframes for that reform.  For the smaller developing nations, the additional funding from the IMF and MBDs would offer the most vulnerable countries additional resources to continue to promote development in turbulent economic times.  However, in order for this additional money to be effective, the IMF must work to repair its image in the developing world and to overcome the stigma associated with IMF borrowing.  Institutional reform is a key part of this process.[51]

The results of the London summit produced a mixed reaction.  The Financial Times said that the summit had represented “some useful progress, but still a way to go;” noting, “the absence of detail about a common approach to cleansing banks of their assets is disconcerting.”[52]  Others were less circumspect in their analysis. Wolfgang Munchau argued that, in the absence of bank recapitalization policies, “not one of [the G-20’s] resolutions will move the world a small step close to resolving the crisis,” adding that “our leaders showed more interest in future crises than the current one.”[53]  Despite these critiques, commentators notice the strong influence of US leadership throughout the summit.  Despite the success of the emerging economies of the G-20 in some areas, the communiqué ultimately reflected the Obama’s desires – “there was nothing in the G20 communiqué that Mr. Obama did not want and relatively little he did not request.”[54]  Ultimately, it was the United States that had the biggest influence in crafting the final message.

However, beyond general impressions of the summit, perhaps the biggest subject of popular commentary was the emergence of China as a more proactive leader on the international stage.  It began before the G-20 sat down to meet in London.  A week before the summit, Shou Xiaochuan, president of China’s central bank, suggested the US dollar eventually be replaced as global reserve currency, perhaps through the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).[55]  After the summit, Chinese officials indicated they were pleased with the proposed reforms of the IMF and were in discussion about contributing $40 billion to the fund.  Continuing to stand up for their national interest, China also resisted a proposition by the French that they feared might label Hong Kong and Macao as tax havens.[56]  In many ways, China used the London summit to begin repositioning itself within the global economic power structure.  After the summit, The Economist suggested that “for China, the purpose of the G-20 summit in London on April 2nd was as much about nudging into place a new alignment of global power as it was about solving the world’s economic problems.”[57]  By the end of the summit, some observers were referring to China and the US as the G2.[58]

China, as the largest of the emerging economies in the G-20 and the third largest economy in the world, has the most power to gain in the shift to the G-20.  However, other emerging G-20 countries have also taken steps to be more assertive in redefining a new economic order.  On June 9, the IMF announced that China planned to purchase $50 billion in Special Drawing Rights as foreign reserves, and Brazil planned to buy $10 billion.  Russia was also in negotiations to buy bonds.  Ownership of SDRs will give these emerging economies more power in the IMF, putting them in a stronger position to advocate for its reform.[59]  However, these powers shifts, though real, are still tentative.  The SDRs are not likely to overtake the dollar as China’s reserve currency any time soon. As the two G-20 leaders summits have illustrated, the United States (with some challenge from Europe) still sets the agenda and largely controls the outcome.

Conclusion

The paper illustrates how the G-20, from the time of its creation to today, slowly emerges as a medium for increasing influence of emerging economies in global financial governance.  With the onset of the global financial crisis, the G-20 has overtaken the G-8 as the forum of choice for discussing issues of international global economic governance.  The current financial crisis has accelerated the reform of international financial institutions to allow for greater voice and participation from non-G7 G-20 countries.  It has also accelerated the emergence of China as a global economic leader.  However, despite these accelerations, the power shifts remain tentative at this point.  The first two G-20 leaders’ summits show that the United States largely sets and controls the agenda for the response to the financial crisis.

Bibliography

[1] Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, “The G20 after Eight Years: How Effective a Vehicle for Developing Country Influence?,” Brookings Institution Global Economy and Development Working Papers, no.12 (October 2007), 6.  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/1017development/ 1017development.pdf

[2] Before Russia was admitted in 1998, the group was known as the G-7, a title which is still used in certain circumstances.  Throughout this paper, the G-7 will be used to refer to the group of Germany, France, Great Britain, Japan, the United States, Italy and Canada.  The G-8 will refer to these countries plus Russia.  The distinction is made because Russia is frequently considered to have more in common with developing nations than the other, more developed, G-8 members.

[3] Peter I. Hajnal, The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role, and Documentation (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 1-5, 11-21.

[4] In 1999, the Interim Committee was renamed the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC).

[5] G-20, “The Group of 20: A History,” G-20, March 11-15, 2008, http://www.g20.org/Documents/history _report_dm1.pdf, 8-18.  Martinez-Diaz, 6-7.

[6] Ibid., 18.

[7] Martinez-Diaz, 7-8.  G-20, “The Group of 20: A History,” 18-22.

[8] Statistics from 2005.  Martinez-Diaz, 8.

[9] G-20, “The Group of 20: A History,” 27-28.

[10] Ibid., 22-25.

[11] Ibid., 28.

[12] Martinez-Daiz notes that the G-20 commitments to fight the financing of global terrorism were more extensive and detailed than those offered by the G-8.  Martinez-Diaz, 12.

[13] G-20, “The Group of 20: A History,” 35-39, 42-45.

[14] “The Group of 20: A History” notes that “to achieve satisfactory long-term economic growth, members agreed on a range of policy measures, including the importance of price stability and fiscal discipline, strong domestic financial institutions, prudent debt management, competition, global trade liberalization, flexible labor markets, education, and social safety nets.” G-20, “The Group of 20: A History,” 41.

[15] G-20, “The Group of 20: A History,” 49.

[16] Ibid., 50.

[17] Ibid., 50.

[18] Richard Samans, et. al., “Introduction: The International Monetary Convention Project: A Public-Private Exploration of the Future of the International Monetary System,” in The International Monetary System, the IMF, and the G20: A Great Transformation in the Making?  ed. Richard Samans, Mark Uzan, and Augusto Lopez-Claros (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), xvii.

[19] Gerry Helleiner, “Developing Countries, Global Financial Governance, and the Group of Twenty: A Note,” University of Oxford Global Economic Governance Program, March 2001, 5.  http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/Helleiner%20on%20G20.PDF.

[20] Martinez-Diaz, 5-17.  In my mind, there is still a question as to whether the push by non-G-7 G-20 members to reform the BWIs will benefit developing countries more broadly or just benefit those in the G-20.

[21] G-20, “The Group of Twenty: A History,” 46.

[22] Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “What Caused the Financial Crisis?,” The Financial Crisis: A Timeline of Events and Policy Actions,  http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=home.

[23] IMF. “Group of Twenty: Meeting of the Deputies (A Note by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund),”  International Monetary Fund, February 5, 2009, 6.  http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/020509.pdf.

[24] Ibid., 7.

[25] “After the Fall: The Global Economic Summit,” The Economist, November 15, 2008.

[26] IMF, 8.  Growth projections as of January 2009.

[27] David McCormick, “Summer Seminar: China,” (Lecture and Q&A, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, July 1, 2009).

[28] “After the Fall: The Global Economic Summit” The Economist, November 15, 2008.

[29] John Kirton, “The Performance of the Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors,” G20 Information Centre, University of Toronto, November 9, 2008.  http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/g20/evaluations/kirton-081109.html.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Morris Goldstein, “G-20 Summit: Neither a Disappointment or a Triumph,” Peterson Perspectives, Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 17, 2008.  http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/pp20081117 goldstein.pdf.

[32] G-20 Leaders, “Declaration of Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy,” G-20, November 15, 2008, 1.  http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf.

[33] Ibid., 3.

[34] Ibid., 4.

[35] Dombey, Daniel.  “Talks challenge club of rich countries.” Financial Times, November 17, 2008, 6.

[36] G-20 Leaders, “Action Plan to Implement Principles of Sound Reform,” G-20, November 15, 2008, 5.  http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf.

[37] Dombey, Daniel.  “Talks challenge club of rich countries.” Financial Times, November 17, 2008, 6.

[38] Il SaKong, “G-20 Summit: Financial Markets and the World Economy” Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 17, 2008.  http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=1053.

[39] G-20, “Communiqué: Meeting of Ministers and Governors, São Paulo – Brazil,” G-20, November 9, 2008, 1.   http://www.g20.org/Documents/2008_communique_saopaulo_brazil.pdf.

[40] G-20 Leaders, “Declaration of Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy,” 1.

[41] David McCormick, “Summer Seminar: China,” (Lecture and Q&A, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, July 1, 2009).

[42] “Finance and Economics: Goodbye G7, Hello G20.”  The Economist, November 22, 2008.

[43] G-20, “Progress Report on the Immediate Actions of the Washington Action Plan prepared by the UK Chair of the G20,” G-20, March 14, 2009, 3-6. http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_
washington_actionplan_progress_140309.pdf.

[44] Financial Stability Forum, “Financial Stability Forum decides to broaden its membership,” Financial Stability Board, March 12 2009.  http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_090312b.pdf.

[45] “When to Judge the G20 Moment; Summit’s success cannot be gauged by communiqué alone,” Financial Times, April 2, 2009, 8.

[46] Chris Giles, et. al. “G20 accused over toxic assets,” Financial Times, April 2, 2009, 1.

[47] G-20 Leaders, “Global Plan for Recovery and Reform,” G-20, April 2, 2009, 4.  http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf.

[48] Ibid., 1.

[49] Ibid., 5-7.

[50] G-20 Leaders, “Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System – London,” G-20, April 2, 2009, 1-2.  http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf.

[51] “Mission: Possible; the IMF,” The Economist, April 11, 2009, 69.

[52] “The First Few Bricks in a New Economic Order; G20 Charts Path towards New Economic Recovery,” Financial Times, April 3, 2009, 10.

[53]Wolfgang Munchau, “The London Summit has not fixed the crisis,” Financial Times, April 6, 2009, 9.

[54] Edward Luce, “Handshake brokered by Obama saves the day,” Financial Times, April 3, 2009, 5.

[55] Jamil Anderlini and Geoff Dyer, “China assumes lead on world economy,” Financial Times, April 2, 2009, 3.

[56] Geoff Dyer, “China greets G20 results with caution,” Financial Times, April 4, 2009, 3.

[57] “Asia: Taking the Summit by Strategy; China and the G20,” The Economist, April 11, 2009, 42.

[58] Jamil Alderlini and Geoff Dyer, “China assumes lead on world economy,” Financial Times, April 2, 2009, 3.

[59] “Finance and Economics: Promises, Promises; the IMF’s search for funds,” The Economist, June 13, 2009, 79.